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1. INTRODUCTION 
An attractive and popular creature, it is seen in a variety of very 
visible and exposed environments, yet it remains elusive, and 
despite a number of attempts at categorisation, it defies precise 
definition. Sadly, this enigmatic combination of qualities may 
precipitate its downfall, for whatever is popular yet misunderstood 
lies open to abuse and, ultimately, untimely extinction.1 
So might the concept of the public interest be described in 
biological terms, for it is employed in a wide variety of public 
forums, though attempts at definition are sparse and 
consensus is non-existent. Such overuse of an underdefined 
term can only lead to confusion and uncertainty in whatever 
context it appears, which is apt to result in the abandonment 
of the 'public interest', due to the frustration it provokes, well 
before its true potential has emerged. 
The employment of the public interest concept has 
increased markedly in recent years within legal contexts2, 
though the absence of a corresponding rise in attempts at 
definition has seen the term become enveloped in an 
unsightly haze that might most aptly be described as a 
menacing mushroom-cloud on the jurisprudential horizon. 
However, just as with nuclear physics, the 'public interest' 
has as much creative as destructive potential if only a greater 
level of understanding and foresight were to govern its usage. 
In this paper, I propose to analyse the philosophical basis 
of the public interest concept, and then examine its 
application within a particular legal context, that of US 
defamation law, in order to assess its potential as the basis for 
An entirely fictitious commentary inc;pired by vivid childhood memories of David 
Attenborough wildlife documentaries. 
Statutory use of the term, once rare, has blossomed in recent years, notably in the 
Official Information Act 1982, where the phrase "public interest" is included in the 
long title and appears six times in Part I alone. It is also prominent in the Mental 
Health Act 19 6 and is a key concept in the Whistleblowers Protection Bill which 
is currently before Parliament. Moreover, a whole body of law entitled "Public 
Interest Law" ha<, rapidly evolved in the last 20 years (see J Cooper & R Dhavan 
(eds) Public Interest Law (Blackwell, Oxford , 1986)). 
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a legal test. Thus, I hope to contribute some clarity to an area 
excessively afflicted with myopia.3 
2. PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS OF THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 
The concept of the public interest has a long history in the 
discourse of political philosophy, but fully-developed treatises 
are rare and a proliferation of partial and incomplete accounts 
characterises this area.4 Much can be gained, however, 
through an examination of the varying analyses that have 
been offered. 
A. Interests 
A necessary preliminary step towards a definition of the 
public interest is to settle on what is meant by the word 
'interest'. Differing meanings of the term are clearly 
employed in the following contexts: 
"I have a great interest in the shapes of leaves"; 
"It would be in your best interest to listen to what I have 
to say". 
To have an interest in the latter sense conveys a more 
complex meaning than may be expressed in terms of what 
captures one's attention and imagination. B.M.Barry states 
that, "a policy, law or institution is in someone's interest if it 
increases his opportunities to get what he wants" .5 In thus 
framing a definition of interest in terms of desire, Barry may 
be appearing to deny that one can mistake one's interests, 
whereas it is commonly believed that one can. However, 
Barry avoids such self-entrapment by claiming that one may 
think that a policy increases one's opportunity to get what 
Of course, there i<; alway" the danger that, in <;uch an area, any additional 
material will only add to the confusion created by many conflicting voices. 
However, such a peril should not be allowed to snuff out the venture before it has 
begun, lest pe<;s imism de<;troy a potentially fruitful enterpri<,e. 
A rare example of a comprehensive account is: RE Flathman The Public Interes t 
Qohn Wiley & Sons, Inc.,New York, 1966). 
BM Barry & WJ Ree, "The Public lntere<;t", in Pro. Anstotcl1a11 Society Supplement 
v3 (1964) 1-3 , at 4. 
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one wants, when in fact it does not: this involves mistaking 
one's interest. 
W.J.Rees approaches the concept of 'interest' from a 
different angle, stating that for a desired activity to give rise to 
an interest: 
(a) the activity must be one that enhances the ease, 
prosperity or chances of survival of the person(s) 
concerned; 
(b) the activity must be one that is liable to be hindered 
by other people or forces of nature.6 
This conception varies with Barry's account in that instead 
of grounding interest in contingent wants and desires, he 
bases it on the enhancement of underlying and invariant 
human values. 
A third definition is seen in the Marxist idea of 'objective 
interest', this being what a class would demand if they were 
fully aware of their social position and the most they could 
get out of it for themselves.? 
Finally, J.Plamanetz provides an account of interests in 
terms of "settled and avowed aspirations of a man or group of 
men which he or they ... believe to be more or less reaiisable".8 
A common theme that may be derived from these 
definitions is that someone's interest is whatever satisfies, to 
some extent, their underlying or basic desires. This may be 
modified by adding that something is only in one's interest if 
it is reasonably attainable in one's social context, for, although 
it may well be a fundamental desire of one to live for 150 
years, it would not be in accordance with common usage to 
say that it was in one's interest. Moreover, to extend the 
concept of interest beyond reasonable desires to an infinitude 
of fanciful wants would deprive it of its focus and much of its 
meaning. 
above n 5, 20. 
SL Benn '"lntercc;ts' in Politics", in Pro. Aristotelian Society v60 (1959-60) 123-40, 
at 128-29. 
J Plamcnat7 "Interests", in Political Studies v2 (1954) 1-8, at 1-2. 
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As an extension of this, 'legal' interests have been 
characterised as claims with reasons offered in support of 
them, or, more specifically, as desires which conform with 
"the jural postulates of society" .9 Thus, 
The case for giving interests legal consideration is not that 
they are wants but that they are more or less reasonable wants, 
according to standards which it is the business of the judge or 
legislator to elicit from the bulk of demands coming forwardlO 
B. The Public lnterest 
Two of the most enduring and influential theories of the 
public interest are those formulated by Bentham and 
Rousseau. Characteristically, Bentham proposed a purely 
utilitarian definition, stating that a government measure is 
in the public interest when the tendency it has to augment 
the happiness of the community is greater than the tendency 
it has to lessen it.1 1 Thus, he saw it to involve a summation 
of the interests of members of the public. On the other hand, 
Rousseau asserted that the public interest was a more 
transcendent concept than Bentham admitted. He claimed 
that the public interest consists of universally shared private 
interests and whatever conforms with 'the General Will', 
which will occur if a policy is equally in the interest of all 
members of the concerned group. Thus, to ascertain what is 
in the General Will, one must ask, "What measure will 
benefit me in common with everyone else, rather than at the 
expense of everyone else?" .12 
In general, the line Bentham took equated the interest of 
the public with whatever advanced the cause of the 
majority13, whereas Rousseau believed that something could 
only be in the public interest if it benefitted everyone equally. 
R Pound "A Survey of Social Intere<,ts" 57 Harv. LR (1943-44) 1-39. 
above n 7, 130. 
TM Benditt "The Public Interest", in Philosophy and Public Affairs v.2 (1972-73) 
291-311, at 311. 
above n 5, 11. 
Bentham's theory does not automatically entail favouring the cause of the 
majority, for a fundamental minority interest will often prevail over a trivial 
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Barry's view seems largely coextensive with that of 
Rousseau, but it is significantly different in thnt Bnrry states 
that the only proposals for public interest should be ones that 
treat everyone in exactly the same way. Thus, n policy 
whereby individual benefits vary enormously could still be in 
the public interest if treatment wns uniform. In illustration, 
Barry claims that the only possible policies regarding the act 
of assault would be, 
(a) that no one should be permitted to assault anyone 
else (except in certain clearly defined circumstnnces); 
(b) that everyone should be permitted to assault 
everyone else.14 
In short, the public interest, for Barry, is embodied in 
whatever is in the interest of all individuals "as members of 
the public".15 This qualification excludes merely group 
interests. For example, as a member of the Sport Shooters 
Association, it may be in one's interest to allow aJI owners of 
automatic weapons to be permitted to shoot anything thnt 
moves, for this is consistent with the aims of the group, 
which are presumably to foster the practice of killing 
harmless and defenceless animals, whereas as a member of 
the public, one may have a conflicting interest in restricting 
mindless violence, this being consistent with the good of the 
wider group. Only the latter can be cntegorised as a public 
interest. In general, any individual wiJI have a number of 
specialised group interests according to the pnstimes they 
favour, which will sometimes be in conflict with the interest 
that they have in common with nil others as a member of the 
public. 
Barry continues that the interests shared by few can easily 
be promoted by them through organisation into, for example, 
pressure groups nnd specialist associations, whereas the 
interests shared by many must be furthered by the State, for it 
alone possesses the coercive power necessary to prevent 
majority interest. However, in anything but the exceptional case, Bentham's 
utilitarianism will favour the majority interest. 
above n 5, 8-9. 
above n 5, 16-17. 
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interest groups from doing what they want at the expense of 
the wider public. This is largely due to the administrative fact 
that it is far easier to organise a small group with a clear and 
narrow focus to protest against certain proposals and 
generally to protect a specialist interest, whereas a group that 
incorporates every member of a society can only be effectively 
represented by a body that has sweeping powers and 
pervasive influence. 
Though using somewhat different conceptual terms, Rees 
substantially agrees with Barry, but he employs a different 
emphasis. He asserts that a policy is in the public interest if: 
(a) it can be justified by referring to standards based on 
widely held expectations and desires limited by what 
appears reasonable in the conditions of society; or 
(b) it is necessary for the maintenance of such 
standards.16 
Benditt asserts that the public interest is an idea that addresses 
particular aspects of the nature of human society, which he 
characterises as an environment in which the individual 
well-being of most is dependent in part on the efforts of other 
members of the group.1 7 In such a context, everyone is likely 
to be more happy if : 
(a) the basic needs of the society's members are taken 
care of; 
(b) the distribution of burdens and benefits is just.1 
He explains the latter requirement by arguing that unjust 
distributions are likely to cause resentment, which, in turn, is 
likely to be destructive to the happiness of the group.19 
Benditt agrees with Barry that to be in the public interest, a 
policy must be in the interest of every member of the public, 
and he further qualifies the conception by stating thnt the 
public interest consists of universnl interests that are in 
above n 5, 32. 
above n 11, 295. 
above n 11, 295. 
above n 11, 296. 
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danger of not being protected or promoted adequately if this is 
not done by the State or some other political authority.20 His 
reason for this addition is that many things may be in the 
interest of everyone in society without meaningfully 
comprising part of the public interest. For example, having 
access to adequate food supplies is undoubtedly in the interest 
of everyone in twentieth century modern society, but to say 
that it is in the public interest dilutes the force of the concept 
by trivialisation through overinclusion. In short, Benditt 
believes that something is in the public interest if (and only 
if): 
(a) it is in the interest of every member of the public 
(ie. it is essential for the protection and/ or 
improvement of everyone's welfare or well-being); 
(b) the means of serving the interest are out of the 
hands of most members of the public and thus the 
interest is only likely to be satisfied by the State.21 
Many writers reject entirely the worth of any concept of the 
public interest in modern society. One of the major 
arguments supporting this point of view is that in large and 
heterogeneous societies, there is no consensus as to the 
normative foundations on which to build a meaningful 
concept of the common good:22 
In a large and diverse nation, there is no common good to be 
mediated through discussion; there is no unitary political truth; 
there are instead irreducibly opposed perspectives and intcrcsts.23 
This view is encapulated in what Clarke E. Cochrnn refers to 
as the 'politics of interest' theoretical school, which adheres to 
the notion that there can be no common good because there 
is nothing that is good for the community as a whole; there 
are only goods and interests pursued by individuals and 
above n 11, 298. 
above n 11, 301. 
C Sunstein "Beyond the Revival", 97 Yale LJ (19 ) 1539, at 1556. 
above n 22, 1572. 
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groups.2 4 Thus, according to this conception, modern society 
is nothing more than a complex of groups competing for 
their own interests, and governmental policy reflects the 
balance of power among the various interest groups.25 
In general, there is no 'public' as such, and invoking the 
public interest is merely a strategy that groups pursue in order 
to promote their own cause. From this viewpoint, there is 
good reason to be suspicious about the State's claim to reflect 
a unitary public good in its policies. A major vulnerability of 
most public interest theories is targetted by this criticism in 
that they require the existence and ascertainability of a 
'common good' and universalism of interest that transcends 
group interests. 
However, as Cass Sunstein argues, universalism does not 
deny the existence of different perspectives, but it does affirm 
the notion that some claims are better than others, and that a 
particular claim can be vindicated through rational 
discussion.26 From this follows a requirement that in the 
course of government policy-making, public-regarding 
justifications are offered after multiple points of view have 
been consulted and understood.27 Thus, the belief in the 
notion of a public interest does not entail that private 
interests should be prevented from being voiced in the 
political arena, but that, on the contrary, the legitimacy of a 
public interest conception is enhanced by the airing of as 
many conflicting views as possible. A formulation of the 
public interest requires the transcendence of any particular 
sub-group context, and this can only be achieved satisfactorily 
through a thorough awareness of the various views and 
perspectives in society. 
Another school of thought identifies the public interest with 
the decision-making process of a democracy. Therefore, the 
public interest is seen to be identical with the democratic 
CE Cochran " Political Science and 'The Public Interest'", Journal of Politics v36 
(1974) 327-55, at 328-29. 
above n 24, 333. 
above n 22, 1574. 
above n 22, 1575. 
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interest-conflict process, as long as that result is responsive to 
the substantive community consensus.28 However, this view 
is problematic in that it implies that the result of this kind of 
decision-making process is inherently beneficial to society, 
and therefore all public policy so derived is in the public 
interest. No procedure, though, is self-justifying, and in the 
face of competing claims, one must have a substantive basis 
for mediation. Thus, the public interest must include a moral 
content that a]]ows judgment of the mediation procedure 
employed in terms of a normative appraisal of the results it 
produces.29 The public interest must incorporate a theory of 
'the good'. 
This conclusion leads directly to the question, "Who is to 
decide on the theory of the good that is to be invoked?". lf the 
government is to rule on this matter, then the possibility that 
it will manipulate 'the public interest' to suit whatever 
agenda it favours looms large, rendering it no more than a 
convenient device for deceit. The public itself is the obvious 
candidate for the decision-making role, though Barry nrgues 
that even when an issue is sufficiently publicised to engender 
a widespread body of opinion, the opinion is likely to be 
misinformed to the extent that the government is inviting 
disaster to adopt it30, as the public falls well short of being a 
fully rational body. However, it is a central premise of 
democracy thnt electors are the only competent judges of their 
interests, and to deny this is to undermine the very political 
system under which we live. 
As Rees argues, it is the right of any citizen to put their 
case and it is the moral duty of the legislntor nnd voter to 
weigh up the claims impartially and decide what best serves 
the public interest from the standpoint of the basic 
underlying values that are centrnl to the society.31 There may 
be n dispute as to what precise values are universa]]y held, 
but consensus can only be reached through a comprehensive 
canvassing of all claims. The public interest is the interest of 
above n 24, 341. 
above n 24, 346. 
aboven5, 16-1 7. 
above n 5, 30. 
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"no one special"32. It is not, as Bentham believed,the interest 
of the majority, or the net interest within society, for this 
contradicts the centrality of universalism and impartiality 
that lend the concept its normative power. The idea of justice 
is also foundational, in that interests can only be said to be 
reconciled when we feel that justice has been done. The 
public interest is not simply a matter of getting what we want 
to the greatest extent possible, as this would allow differential 
treatment and varying benefits.33 
Within his comprehensive treatment of the subject, 
Flathman provides what is possibly the most attractive 
definition of the public interest that has been proffered in 
philosophical circles: 
[P]ublic interest is a general commendatory concept u<;ed in <;electing 
and justifying public policy. It has no general, unchanging, 
dec;criptive meaning applicable to all policy decic;ionc;, but a 
nonarbitrary descriptive meaning can be determined for it in 
particular cases. This descriptive meaning is properly found 
through reasoned discourse which attempt<; to relate the 
anticipated effects of a policy to community values and to tec;t that 
relation by formal principles.34 
Thus, policy-makers in government must take into account 
moral considerations, community values and individual 
interests, and give reasons for their decisions in terms of 
these values.35 If, and only if, the government strictly abides 
by these conditions can it be said to be acting in the public 
interest. It must be noted though that the public interest is 
not simply to be identified with the result of this process (as it 
would thereby be reduced to a purely procedural notion), but 
the result should be open to scrutiny in terms of whether it is 
consistent with the normative theory of "the good" that is 
identified by the public itself. Therefore, the process described 
above n 7, 134. 
above n 24, 336. 
above n 4, 2. 
above n 4. 
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above is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
government to be said to be acting in the public interest. 
One might well conclude at this point that all the cogitation 
embodied in the above discussion is all very well, but it does 
not advance the cause for the systematic application of the 
public interest to the legislative and judicial arenas, due to a 
lack of specificity and general vagueness. However, 
Flathman's claim that "a nonarbitrary descriptive meaning 
can be determined for the [public interest] in particular cases" 
should be borne in mind. Having said this, it is certainly true 
that Flathrnan's conception of the public interest appears to be 
elusive and vague when presented as a stark unadorned 
definition as above. Its adequateness can only be properly 
judged by assessing how it can be employed in specific 
practical situations. Flathrnan himself provides the 
illustration of the building of an intraurban expressway to 
demonstrate how public policy decision-making should 
incorporate the public interest.36 In such a case, the group 
interests involved may include those of commuters, property 
owners and, indirectly, taxpayers. In order to command 
support for their positions, these groups will generalise their 
claims by subsuming them within community values. Thus, 
property owners will not simply argue that they do not wish 
their houses to be condemned, but perhaps that they are 
concerned that the destruction of certain types of 
neighbourhood environments may be harmful to the 
beneficial growth of the community as a whole. Such a 
process will identify many of the community values relevant 
to the decision. Where such values conflict, one can often 
make a reasoned decision as to how the competing values 
may be most effectively served in the situation at hand. ln a 
case where two conflicting community values will be equally 
compromised by opposing decisions, a resolution regarding 
which value is to be favoured must be made on the basis of 
logic and detailed evidence. 
above n 4, 68- 2. 
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For example, with regard to the hypothetical expressway, 
property owners may list the positive consequences of 
maintaining neighbourhoods such as theirs, whereupon 
developers will counter that they are mistaken as to their 
projection of consequences. The property owners will then 
attempt to demonstrate the rational validity of their 
assessment, and gradually each party wi11 be forced into a 
deeper examination of community values and their 
importance in this particular situation. 
Obviously, there will be occasions on which it will be 
impossible to be sure which value should be favoured and 
any decision will be open to the charge of arbitrariness. 
However, Flathman argues that once a detailed analysis of 
how conflicting community values are affected has been 
conducted, the element of whim and caprice in decision-
making is limited as far as possible, and the result is greatly 
preferable to a decision reached without any examination of 
how the public interest will be served. He also states that 
although in some situations a policy decision will not be 
possible on public interest grounds, this is no reason for 
abandoning the concept in all situations.37 
Thus, Flathman shows what he means when he states that "a 
nonarbitrary descriptive meaning can be determined for the 
[public interest] in particular cases" through demonstrating 
how his public interest concept may be applied in the 
environment of municipal public policy. In the following 
discussion, I will attempt to extend such an application 
beyond local government policy to national civil law. In 
particular, I will examine how the concept of the public 
interest may fruitfully be employed in defamation law. A 
convenient foundation for such a discussion is US 
defamation law, where the notion of the public interest has 
been thoroughly examined and widely applied in the judicial 
context. 
3. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
CONCEPT IN AMERICAN DEFAMATION LAW 
above n 4, 72. 
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Prior to 1964, US defamation law utilised the common law 
standard developed in the UK. Thus, in order to establish a 
prima facie case, a plaintiff only had to prove: 
(a) that the words complained of referred to him/her 
(b) that the words were defamatory of him/her (where 
a "defamatory" meaning can be assumed of words 
which "tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of 
right-thinking members of society generally"38) 
(c) that the words were published by the defendant to a 
third party.39 
This test is heavily weighted in favour of the plaintiff in that 
it does not require a showing of fault or dishonest motive on 
the part of the defendant, or evidence of actual harm to the 
plaintiff's reputation.40 Indeed, in order to prevail, a 
defendant has to prove that their statements were true or 
otherwise privileged.41 The burden of proof is thereby 
squarely placed on the defendant, and, "whatever a man 
publishes, he publishes at his own peril" .42 
However, the US Supreme Court decision in New York 
Times v Sullivan43 marks an abrupt and radical departure 
from the common law defamation standard. The case 
involved an advertisement that alleged racial discrimination 
by the police and other municipal officials. The respondent, 
who was the Commissioner of Public Affairs responsible for 
police supervision, brought a defamation action. In deciding 
for the New York Times, the Supreme Court emphasised the 
special importance of free speech in the US Constitution. The 
court's decision is based on the First Amendment provision 
that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press"44, which also applies to state law by 
WC Hodge & JES Allin Torts in New Z ealand (OUP, Auckland, 1988) 380. 
C Duncan & B Neill Duncan & Neill on Defamation (2ed, Butterworths, London, 
1983) 21. 
Restatement of Torts§ 559 cmt. d (1938). 
above n 40, § 613(2). 
Peck v Tribune Co. 214 US 185 (1909), 189. 
11 L ed 2d (1964). 
Constitution of the United States of America, Amendment l. 
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virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment provision that "[n]o 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States" .45Arguing against the common law practice of placing 
the burden of proof on the defendant, Brennan J proclaimed, 
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all 
his factual asscrtions ... dampens the vigour and limits the variety of public 
debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.46 
Accordingly, the ratio stated that for a public official 
plaintiff to succeed in a defamation action, they must prove 
that the statement was made with "actual malice", which 
consists of "knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not"47. 
The rule in Nezu York Times v Sullivan has been 
significantly extended through a series of Supreme Court 
cases. Curtis P1tblishing Co. v B1ttts 48 held that the test 
should apply not just to public officials but to any public 
figure, while Rosenbloom v Metromedia, Jnc .. 49 extended 
the test to all "communication involving matters of public or 
general concern, without regard to whether the persons 
involved are famous or anonymous" .so 
Rosenbloom was a pivotal case in that it altered the focus 
for constitutional protection from the status of the plaintiff to 
the subject-matter of the involved statement. The court 
found that basing protection of speech on the public/ private 
plaintiff status distinction was an artificial and indirect mode 
of ascertaining what speech involves matters of the public 
interest, which is the core concern of the First Amendment. 
The court's reasoning is embodied in the following 
statement: 
above n 44, Amendment XIV. 
above n 43, 706. 
above n 43, 706. 
388 us 130 (1967). 
403 us 29 (1971 ). 
above n 49, 43-44. 
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If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot 
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is 
involved, or because in some sense the individual did not 
"voluntarily" choose to become involved. The public's primary 
interest is in the event; the private focus is on the conduct of the 
participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, 
not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety ... Whether the 
person involved is a famous large-scale magazine distributor or a 
"private" businessman running a corner newsstand has no relevance 
in ascertaining whether the public has an interest in the issue.51 
The Supreme Court returned to a plaintiff-status based test in 
Gertz v Robert Welch, lnc. 52, by removing comprehensive 
constitutional protection from speech that involves a private-
figure plaintiff, reasoning that relative to public figures, 
private individuals have little opportunity to redress harm 
through public channels of communication, and they have 
not voluntarily assumed an increased risk of injury.53 
Therefore, they must automatically be afforded greater legal 
protection. The test that was employed, focused on "the 
nature and extent of an individual's participation in [aJ 
particular [public] controversy giving rise to the 
defamation" .54 In private-figure plaintiff actions, freedom 
was to be given to individual states to define an appropriate 
standard of liability, provided that strict liability was not 
imposed (thus preventing a return to common law 
standards).55 
The developing trend of confusion and self-contradiction 
within the Supreme Court continued in Dun & Bradstreet 
Inc. v Greenmoss Builders56, which returned the focus of 
constitutional protection to speech involving "matters of 
above n 49, 41. 
418 us 323 (1974). 
above n 52, 345. 
above n 52, 352. 
above n 52,347. 
472 us 749 (1985). 
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public concern"57, again relegating the plaintiff-status test, 
that originated in New York Times, to the periphery. 
The court threw the subject-matter distinction into sharp 
relief by not specifying what level of protection must be 
afforded to speech involving private matters, thus opening 
up the possibility of a return to common law strict liability in 
such cases.SS 
The decision in Plziladelplzia Ne1ospapers v Hepps5 9 
reinforced this approach by placing its emphasis on public 
concern rather than public figures and by stating that a purely 
private matter did not require a change in the common law 
standard.60 
In general, at various points in the 30 years since New York 
Times, the level of constitutional protection that was held to 
be provided for over and above the common law standard 
has varied according to a number of different tests (plaintiff-
sta tus test; media/ nonmedi a disti nction61; subject-matter 
test), applied singly or in combination. Currently, the US 
Supreme Court appears to favour the subject-matter test as 
the sole criterion, holding that constitutional protection is 
available for comment that is of public concern or is in the 
public interest. 
4. CRITIQUES OF THE PUBLIC CONCERN/INTEREST 
TEST 
The public concern/interest test has attracted a great deal of 
criticism in the context of defamation law. A major cause for 
disquiet is that the Supreme Court has never provided a 
comprehensive definition of what the public interest 
involves and how the standard is to be applied. In 
Green moss, the court held that a matter of public concern 
above n 56, 758-759. 
above n 56, 759-760. 
475 us 767 (1986). 
above n 59, 775. 
Sec discussion in AW Langvardt "Media Defendants, Public Concerns, and Public 
Plaintiffs: Toward Fashioning Order from Confuc;ion in Defamation Law" 49 Univ. 
of Pittc;burgh LR (19 7) 91, at 114-123. 
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must be determined on the basis of the statement's "content, 
form, and context...as revealed by the whole record" .62 
Cynthia Estland accurately decribes this as a "strikingly 
vacuous formulation" .63 The decision in H epps failed to 
rectify this vagueness by way of clarification, seemingly 
content with the presumption that "judges will know it 
when they see it" .64 This approach fosters inconsistent 
judicial determination and, in failing to provide guidelines 
on which members of the public might hope to determine 
whether their speech may be labelled as defamatory or not, it 
has a chilling effect on speech and it provokes self-censorship 
(the antithesis of the aim in Nezu York Tirnes), for few people 
will be willing to risk a costly libel suit. 
Many lower court decisions demonstrate how the public 
concern test has led to confusion and inconsistency. 
The Indiana Court of Appeals, adopting the Ro senbloom 
test, curiously ruled that once a public interest was found, it 
became "unimportant...whether the public has a Legitimate 
interest in [the] issue"65 , thus seemingly conflating the 
distinction between what the public finds interesting and 
what is in the public interest. 
A later case in the same court involved an article 
concerning a model who was being used to promote the 
Indianapolis 500 motor race. The article implied that the 
model had been involved in illegal sexual activities and the 
newspaper in which it was published was consequently sued 
for defamation. The court held that, as there was a public 
interest in the Indianapolis 500, the defamation also involved 
a matter of the public interest, even though the race was not 
at issue.66 
above n 56, 761. 
CL Estland "Speech on Matters of Public Concern; The Perils of an Emerging First 
Amendment Category" 59 George Washington LR 1, 32. 
A comment that was originally applied to decisions involving obscenity in 
Jacobellis v Ohio 378 US 184 (1964), 197, but frequently adapted to convey jud icial 
attitudes with regard to the public interest. 
AAFO Heating & Air Conditwning Co. v Nortltwes t Publicatwns 162 Ind . App. 671 
(1974), 673. 
Coc/iran v Indianapolis Newspapers, In c. 372 NE 2d 1211 (Ind. App. 1978). 
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This approach to public interest defamation is mirrored in 
Gaeta v New York News, Inc.6 7, where a newspaper 
published a series of articles regarding the State's policy of 
transferring mentally ill patients from hospitals to nursing 
homes. One article focused on the plaintiff's husband, who 
had been relocated under this programme. The writer 
reported that psychiatrists attributed his mental condition to a 
"messy divorce and the fact that [his] son killed himself 
because his mother dated other men".68 The New York Court 
of Appeals found that as the state practice at issue involved a 
subject of public concern, and the article's nature was not 
changed by using a single case in illustration, the statement 
itself was of public concern.69 
ln such cases, it is clear that "I t]he public concern test...is 
applied so broadly that private/ public distinctions are 
virtually meaningless" .70 
The almost unlimited discretion that is accorded US 
judges in defamation cases as a result, leads to constitutional 
concerns. In his dissenting judgment in Rosenbloom, 
Marshall J focused on this issue by pointing out that lower 
court analyses of what constituted the public interest would 
involve courts in the dangerous practice of deciding "what 
information is relevant to self-government" .71 Such ad hoe 
judicial legislation is apt to raise pointed questions regarding 
the separation of powers and the constitutional role of the 
judiciary. As Langvardt states, 
465 NE 2d 802. 
above n 67, 803. 
above n 67, 805. 
courts should not be making judgments whether a certain matter is 
important enough or public enough for citi?ens properly to take into 
account in determining whether someone i fit for public office" .72 
DV Joy "The 'Public Interest or Concern' Test-Have We Re-.urrected a Standard that 
Should have Remained in the Defamation Graveyard?" 70 Marquette LR (1987) 
647, at 667. 
above n 49, 79. 
above n 61 , 139. 
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The possibility of overcoming these distinct problems by 
narrowing down the concept of public interest/ concern has 
been variously described by commentators as a "remote"73 
prospect, involving an "unconquerable maze"74 and "a 
problematic and unacceptable standard" .75 A solution based 
on narrowing down the concept of public interest/ concern, so 
that it yields relatively predictable results, would necessarily 
favour some people's views of the public interest over those 
of others and it would constitute "an intolerable restriction 
on the freedom of public debate".76 For example, Robert Bork 
once proposed that First Amendment protection should be 
limited to "criticisms of public officials and policies, proposals 
for the adoption or repeal of legislation or constitutional 
provisions and speech addressed to the speech of any 
government unit" .77 However, this would exclude from 
protection most literature and art, and indeed much speech 
involving controversial matters that were yet to crystalise 
into specific proposals for government action.78 Thus, though 
an adequately predictable standard may be available, it is not a 
desirable test to adopt due to its extreme exclusivity. 
Langvardt concludes that "perhaps the term public concern 
defies definition in any meaningful sense".79 
The writers who attack the public concern test imply that the 
alternative they advocate (the plaintiff-status test) is not 
prone to the very objections that they raise regarding the 
public interest standard. However, the lower courts display 
just as much confusion and vagueness in applying a plaintiff-
status test as they demonstrate when faced with the subject-
matter test. A case in point is Brewer v Memphis Pllblis!Ling 
Co.BO, in which the court held that an article linking an 
alleged affair between a woman and Elvis Presley and the 
above n 63, 42. 
above n 61, 132. 
above n 70, 671. 
above n 63, 43. 
R Bork "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems" 47 Ind. LJ 1, 20. 
above n 63, 43. 
above n 61, 128. 
626 F.2d 1238 (1980), 452 US 962 (1980). 
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woman's divorce was privileged, as the woman and her 
husband were public figures, due to the fact that they had 
previously been a beauty queen and a professional football 
player respectively. The court reasoned that, "the First 
Amendment requires that the press be afforded ... protection 
vis-a-vis those who have sought its coverage, either through 
direct invitation or by participating in activities whose success 
depends in large part on publicity" .81 Thus, anyone who has 
been involved in a public event is to be deemed a public 
figure, which seems to extend the concept to absurd 
proportions. 
The public concern test has frequently been charged with 
opposing the thrust of the New York Times decision: 
New York Times and Butts have been regarded by the Court as 
establishing an actual malice rule that is triggered by the presence 
of one factor, a public plaintiff. An attempt now ... to require the 
public concern determination .. . would amount to a cutting back 
on ... the actual malice rule as it has evolved over the years" . 2 
However, Chadwick refutes this claim, stating that, "the 
question of whether a particular statement implicates a 
matter of public concern is central to the reasoning, if not the 
language, of every major Supreme Court decision" _83 For 
example, the judgment in Ne1u York Times states "we 
consider this case against a background of a profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open" _84 
Moreover, in Rosenblatt v Baer85, the court held that " [ t]here 
is, first, a strong interest in debate on public issues, and, 
second, a strong interest in debate about those persons who 
are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of 
above n 80, 1255. 
above n 61 , 128. 
J Chadwick " A Conflict in the Public Interest: Defamation and the Role of Content 
in the Wake of Oun & Bradstreet v Greenmoss Bwlders" 31 Santa Clara LR (1991 ) 
997, at 1000. 
above n 43, 269 (empha'>is added). 
3 3 us 75. 
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those issues" _86 Waldbaum v Fairchild Publications87 
(discussed Jater) also demonstrates that application of the 
Supreme Court status-based test must in fact centre on an 
analysis of the subject-matter of the concerned statement. 
lndeed, there are strong grounds for arguing that the 
status test strays much fllrtlzer from the Nezo York Times 
justifications for speech protection than the subject-matter 
test. This is due to the fact that through focusing on who the 
plaintiff is, many decisions have effectively given carte 
blanche to anyone to say anything they like about certain 
people, irrespective of the public value of the comment. An 
illustrative case is Carson v Allied News Co.BB, in which 
Johnny Carson and his second wife, Joanna Holland, were 
found to be public figures with regard to reports that Carson 
had moved his show to Hollywood so as to be near Holland, 
while he was still married to his first wife. 
Therefore, whereas New York Times introduced 
constitutional protection for certain statements so as to 
facilitate the "interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people" 9, the 
status test may be used to protect defamatory statements that 
make no contribution to such an "interchange of ideas" 
whatsoever, as long as the victim is of sufficient notoriety. 
Gertz justifies imposition of the plaintiff-status test in large 
part by arguing that "public figures" have voluntarily 
assumed the risk of greater public scrutiny by thrusting 
themselves into the public eye.90 However, as was stated in 
Rosenbloom, 
the idea that certain "public figures" have voluntarily exposed 
their entire lives to public inspection, while private individuals 
above n 85, 85-86 (emphasis added). 
627 F.2d 1287 (DC Cir 1980), cert. denied, 449 US 9 (1980). 
529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976). 
above n 43,269. 
above n 52, 350. 
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have kept theirs carefully shrouded from public view is, at best, a 
legal fiction.91 
Chadwick adds that the "mere statistical probability that one 
who attracts public curiosity will eventually be libeled is not 
sufficient justification to assert that they have voluntarily 
assumed the risk of such libels" _92 
Indeed, in thus affording public figures scant protection 
from defamatory statements, no matter how ludicrous or 
depraved, the plaintiff-status test is likely to discourage 
people from entering the public arena, either in an official or 
unofficial capacity, which is certainly contrary to the values 
inherent in the First Amendment. By contrast, "a content-
based analysis will encourage the courts to consider the issues 
that lie at the heart of the conflict between constitutional 
protections of free expression and the societal interest in 
protecting individual reputation" _93 
In general, therefore, it is certainly the case that the public 
interest/ concern test in US defamation law has caused many 
problems in application due to its lack of judicial definition. 
However, the alternative that is invariably proposed of basing 
constitutional protection on plaintiff status is prone to many 
of the same problems and it also fails to focus on what should 
be the core of protection: speech that concerns matters of the 
public interest. 
Thus, it is submitted that the public interest/ concern test 
is a preferable standard in that it adheres much more closely 
to the values addressed by the First Amendment by 
concentrating on public issues rather than public (and 
sometimes merely notorious) speakers. However, this is a 
standard that should also be abandoned in defamation law if 
it effectively suppresses free speech by virtue of its vagueness 
and therefore its proneness to inconsistent application. 
above n 49, 47-48. 
above n 80, 1015. 
above n 0, 1061. 
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5. THE VIABILITY OF A PUBLIC INTEREST TEST IN 
DEFAMATION LAW 
The question accordingly remains: "Is the concept of the 
public interest capable of definition to a degree of precision 
that will support a legal test whereby consistent judicial 
application will be facilitated?" 
Chadwick offers a proposal for a public interest test 
adapted from the public figure standard that was devised in 
Waldbawn v Fairchild Publications.94 In this case, the court 
adopted a three-step process through which to determine 
whether someone may be considered to be a public figure for 
the purposes of a particular controversy: 
(i) A public controversy must be involved, i.e. a 
dispute that in fact has received public attention 
because its ramifications will be felt by persons who are 
not direct participants; 
(ii) The plaintiff must have been purposely trying to 
influence the outcome or realistically have been 
expected, due to their position in the controversy, to 
have an impact on its resolution; 
(iii) The alleged defamation must have been germane 
to the plaintiff's participation in the controversy.95 
Chadwick's test is as follows: 
I. Is a public controversy involved? 
A. Is there a "real dispute," i.e. an issue where there is substantial 
and reasonable variance of opinion among those addressing it, such 
that assertions as to the conduct of persons involved will not 
automatically be dismissed as spurious and fal'>e? 
B. Will the outcome of the dispute affect the general public, or a 
'>ignificant segment of it, in an appreciable way; i.e. will its 
ramifications be felt by a significant number of per on who are not 
direct participants? 
above n 7. 
above n 87, 1296. 
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[]. Is the statement pertinent to the plaintiff's participation in that 
controversy? 
Ill. Docc:; the plaintiff'c:; involvement in the events giving ric:;e to the 
controversy predate the making of the defamatory statement?96 
Upon all elements of the test being satisfied, the "actual 
malice" standard would be applied, whereas otherwise the 
individual state's common law would operate. Chadwick 
asserts that the first element, by requiring a "real dispute", 
would ensure that the standard was not extended to fanciful 
or irrelevant assertions. Moreover, as the outcome must 
affect a "significant number of persons who are not direct 
participants", the focus of the First Amendment (facilitating 
speech regarding truly public issues) is addressed. The second 
element is designed to prevent every aspect of a person's life 
from being "fair game", and the requirement that the 
controversy must predate the defamatory statement prevents 
the defendant manufacturing a controversy in order to attack 
the plaintiff's reputation.97 
6. A PROPOSAL 
In order to assess whether Chadwick's test can be 
accommodated within a philosophical notion of the public 
interest and yet is sufficiently narrowly constructed to 
constitute a workable legal standard, one must establish first 
where the public interest stands with respect to defamation. 
Thus, "What is the universal consensus in society (based on 
widely held underlying expectations and desires) as to the 
values of free speech and reputation, and how may these 
values be reconciled in the specific area of defamation 
law?" .98 
Free Speech 
It is central to democratic theory that the public are to be the 
only ultimate judges as to how society should be run. lt 
above n 83, 1059. 
above n 83, 1060. 
see above n 10-35 and accompanying text. 
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follows that, pursuant to this, the public should have access 
to all information that is pertinent to the running of public 
affairs. Therefore, individuals who assume a public role and 
are thus representatives of the people, must be accountable to 
them, in that they may validly be the objects of public debate 
regarding their suitability for the role and the performance of 
their function. 
Reputation 
"Reputation" is generally regarded as a good that is to be 
guarded jealously. Once it has been compromised, it is often 
irreparably damaged, and so provisions must be in place to 
protect this "delicate jewel" from unjustified blows. 
Common Ground 
In a democracy, the public interest in free access to 
information only extends to material that has a bearing on 
the conduct of public affairs. This interest does not extend to 
the private lives of public figures unless such private conduct 
can be seen to impinge on one's suitability for a public 
representative role. Any interpretation of what sorts of 
conduct may be open to defamatory discussion must take into 
account the public interest in encouraging people to engage in 
public life, and in protecting reputation. Thus, a fairly narrow 
interpretation is required, and such matters as sexual 
affiliation and consensual sexual practice will generally fall 
outside such bounds.99 
Moreover, the private lives of public figures who play no 
role in government, such as prominent sportspeople and 
movie stars, are of no general universal value to the public. 
Therefore, it should be a case of "publisher beware" with 
regard to untrue gossip. 
Of course, many people would argue that sexual practice doe<; impinge on one'" 
suitability for public office, in that it can be argued that a person who cheats on 
their spouse will also cheat on the public when their temptation is arou.,ed . 
However, this parallel involves a tenuous connection (many philandering 
governmental figures have led irreproachable public live<,), and the intere<,t in 
encouraging public participation must militate against its overu<,e. 
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Chadwick's formulation addresses these matters and it fairly 
represents a correct balance between the competing public 
interests in free speech and reputation. However, the test he 
devised is too general in that it may still yield inconsistent 
judicial decisions, thereby having a chilling effect on free 
speech. All the questions posed within the test are of a 
general nature, which could be interpreted in a wjde variety 
of ways. Therefore, I propose that a legal test should build on 
Chadwick's base, but it should be more narrowly defined, 
while avoiding the trap of arbitrarily excluding ideas of the 
public interest that are genuinely held in a society.JOO Thus, 
for example, one could stipulate that the private lives of 
public figures who do not fill official governmental roles are 
strictly off-bounds to untrue assertions. Moreover, it could be 
ruled that the private lives of official figures should only be 
open to false comment if a clear connection could be 
established between their private conduct and their public 
functions so as to demonstrably impinge upon the fulfilment 
of their duties. 
These are, of course, speculative suggestions, and the details 
of a defamation standard based on the public interest would 
have to be arrived at through intense public enquiry, using 
Chadwick's test as a sound starting-point. Legislative 
enactment would be the most satisfactory method of 
entrenching a public interest standard, for it would provide 
for suitably open public involvement and thorough 
parliamentary discussion of any ramifications. 
In any area of the law, a public interest standard would have 
to tread the fine line between being so broad that judicial 
application would be unpredictable, thereby resulting in a 
dangerously chilling effect on free speech; and being so 
narrow that many of the population's conceptions of the 
public interest would be excluded. Legislative enactment may 
be able to take us a long way towards a satisfactory 
compromise, but to some extent the judiciary will be 
unavoidably involved in defining the public interest for the 
see above n 71-77 and accompanying text. 
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people in individual cases. lt is submitted that the level of 
discretion necessitated by the use of a legal public interest 
standard would by no means be intolerable in a democracy. 
Indeed, it is a realistic hope that a body of judicial precedent 
would be built so that predictable results occurred,101 while 
the test employed fairly represented general views of the 
public interest in a heterogeneous society. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The public interest is indeed an elusive creature, but it is real, 
and, I submit, it is capable of being crystalised into a useful 
judicial standard. 
The abstract notions of political philosophers such as Benn, 
Barry and Rees have been developed into a more practical 
form by Flathman, who demonstrates that public policy 
decision-makers may fruitfully apply a public interest 
standard that minimises arbitrariness and provides a 
reasoned solution. 
US defamation law then provides an example of an attempt 
at using the public interest within a judicial environment, 
and the Wrzldbaum formulation of a public figure test steers a 
path amid surrounding confusion towards a workable 
solution. Chadwick's adaptation of the Wrzldbrz11111 test is 
capable of further refinement, and this could lead to a viable 
and valuable public interest standard in defamation law. The 
impetus would thus be provided for a more systematic and 
soundly-based application of the term "public interest" across 
the many areas of the law in which it currently proliferates 
without adequate definition. 
In New Zealand, a more conc;istent line of precedent than that which has evolved 
in the US would be facilitated by a judicial structure that is much smaller, c;impler, 
and more directly hierarchical. 
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